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The ability to identify an appropriate sequence of actions or to consider alternative possible action
sequences might be particularly useful during problem solving in the physical domain. We developed
a new ‘paddle-box’ task to test the ability of different ape species to plan an appropriate sequence of
physical actions (rotating paddles) to retrieve a reward from a goal location. The task had an adjustable
difﬁculty level and was not dependent on species-speciﬁc behaviours (e.g. complex tool use). We inves-
tigated the planning abilities of captive orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) and bonobos (Pan paniscus) using
the paddle-box. In experiment 1, subjects had to rotate one or two paddles before rotating the paddleonobo
reat ape
lanning
nhibitory control
roblem solving
ognition
with the reward on. Subjects of both species performed poorly, though orangutans rotated more non-
food paddles, which may be related to their greater exploratory tendencies and bolder temperament
compared with bonobos. In experiment 2 subjects could always rotate the paddle with the reward on
ﬁrst and still succeed, and most subjects of both species performed appropriate sequences of up to three
paddle rotations to retrieve the reward. Poor performance in experiment 1 may have been related to
subjects’ difﬁculty in inhibiting the prepotent response to act on the reward immediately.. Introduction
Planning as an everyday concept has many connotations, and
everal terms are used more or less interchangeably to describe a
yriad of behaviours that do not seem to have much in common
Parrila et al., 1996). At one end of the spectrum, planning can con-
ist of anticipating the consequences of motor actions, for example
rasping an object in an appropriate orientation (end-state com-
ort effect; Rosenbaum et al., 1990). This has been demonstrated to
evelop early in humans (by 19months of age;McCarty et al., 1999)
nd also tohave emerged early in primatephylogeny, beingpresent
n several lemur species (Chapman et al., 2010). At the other end
f the spectrum lies episodic future thinking: the ability to men-
ally project oneself into an imagined future scenario (Suddendorf
nd Corballis, 1997). There is continuing debate regarding which,
f any, nonhuman species possess this latter capacity, with some
esearchers presenting experimental evidence for animals imagin-
ng and planning for future events (Mulcahy and Call, 2006; Osvath,
009; Osvath and Karvonen, 2012; Osvath and Osvath, 2008; Raby
 This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and
eproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
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et al., 2007) and others arguing that foresight is an uniquely human
ability (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007; Suddendorf et al., 2009).
Clearly, these two examples of planning, and the multitude of
intermediate cases, must pose very different cognitive demands
and vary in terms of their information processing requirements
(Chappell et al., 2012; Tecwyn et al., 2012).
Bearing this in mind, it is important to specify the type of plan-
ning that is of interest here, which is the type of planning that may
be involved in problem solving that is oriented towards current
needs. This can be deﬁned as the ability to identify an appropri-
ate sequence of actions or consider alternative courses of action
prior to execution (see Tecwyn et al., 2012 for further discussion).
Behaviours exhibited by wild great apes that may involve this type
of planning include the use of ‘tool-sets’ for extractive foraging
of honey by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes: Brewer and McGrew,
1990); ‘engineering’ of alliances with the most proﬁtable part-
ners by bonobos (Pan paniscus; Aureli et al., 2008; Hohmann and
Fruth, 2002); hierarchical processing of plant material by goril-
las (Gorilla beringei beringei: Byrne et al., 2001) and gap-crossing
in the compliant forest canopy by orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus:
Chevalier-Skolnikoff et al., 1982).
How might planning for current needs be investigated experi-
mentally? Several papers have advocated developing experimental
methodologies and paradigms that consider different species’ pre-
dispositions to allow testing ofmultiple species (Santos et al., 2006;
Amici et al., 2010; MacLean et al., 2012), as at present systematic
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nterspeciﬁc comparisons are still rare (Schmitt et al., 2012). This is
mportant in order to avoid the presentation of tasks in an ‘unfair’
anner, hence biasing for or against the abilities of certain species
Roth and Dicke, 2005). To date, studies investigating planning
or current needs in nonhuman species have mostly fallen in to
ne of two categories: those involving the use of tools, and those
nvolving computerised interfaces (but see e.g. Dunbar et al., 2005;
uczaj et al., 2009; Miyata et al., 2011 for interesting alternative
pproaches).
Tool-use studies of planning, usually focused on sequential tool-
se, or metatool use (e.g. Bird and Emery, 2009; Hihara, 2003;
artin-Ordas et al., 2012; Mulcahy et al., 2005; Taylor et al.,
007, 2010; Wimpenny et al., 2009) have yielded many interest-
ng insights. However, they may not be ideal when attempting to
evelop a comparative planning paradigm, for at least two reasons.
irst, they bias against non-tool-using species, as the behaviours
nvolved in solving the taskmaynot formpartof theirnatural reper-
oire, and may require fairly precise manipulatory abilities (e.g.
ufﬁcient motor control to hold a stick and insert it into a narrow
ube). Second, there is evidence to suggest that removing tool-use
rom physical cognition problems can reduce cognitive load and
mprove performance (Seed et al., 2009). Therefore, if it is planning
ather than tool-use that is the focus of study, it seems prudent to
void the requirement for tool-use.
Studies involving computerised environments have also been
sed to investigate planning ability. These require subjects to use
ither a touch-screen or joystick, for example to navigate through a
wo-dimensional maze (e.g. Fragaszy et al., 2003, 2009; Miyata and
ujita, 2008; Pan et al., 2011) or to recall a sequence of numbers
Beran et al., 2004; Biro and Matsuzawa, 1999). Such techniques
ertainly have experimental advantages, such as precise timing
f stimulus presentation and automatic recording of behavioural
esponses. However, they are expensive and time-consuming to
mplement, with subjects requiring extensive training to use the
xperimental apparatus prior to the start of testing. Furthermore,
hephysical and temporal distancebetweenstimulus, responseand
eward, and the need for reﬁnedmotor abilities can be problematic,
articularly for younger individuals (Mandell and Sackett, 2008).
A further problem with these and other cognitive tasks such as
he trap-tube paradigm (Visalberghi and Limongelli, 1994) is that
nitial errorsmade by the subject are often correctable. In trap-tube
asks for example, the reward can initially be moved in one direc-
ion, but the direction could be switched before the reward falls in a
rap. Although error correction strategies can be enlightening (e.g.
eLoache et al., 1985), having the option of correcting an errormay
educe the motivation of subjects to make the correct choice in the
rst place, or to plan for the correct solution (Tecwyn et al., 2012).
As well as considering the practical and paradigmatic issues
aised above, it has been suggested recently by MacLean et al.
2012) that it would be fruitful for researchers to design tasks
ith an adjustable level of difﬁculty, in order to avoid the mask-
ng of meaningful variation due to ﬂoor or ceiling effects. In the
ase of planning during problem solving, it would be useful to have
task that could distinguish between, for example, the ability to
ake selections between alternatives (proto-deliberative; Sloman,
010) and the ability to explore branching futures (fully delibera-
ive; Sloman, 2010), which differ in terms of their computational
urden.
The aims of this paper were two-fold. First, we aimed to design
new paradigm appropriate for comparative testing of planning
bility in primate species (including humans) that:Did not involve complex tool-use
Did not depend on species-speciﬁc behaviours/competences
Had an adjustable level of difﬁcultycesses 100 (2013) 174–184 175
• Did not have a performance outcome that was dependent on a
binary choice, in order to reduce the possibility of the task being
solved by chance
• Was not correctable, to encourage subjects to choose correctly
initially
• Could be conﬁgured in a trial-unique manner, so the task had to
be considered anew for each trial.
Second, we aimed to use the new paradigm to investigate
whether captive bonobos and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) are
able to plan an appropriate sequence of actions (a) in advance
(experiment 1); or (b) sequentially (experiment 2), in order to
retrieve a food reward from a goal location. These species are of
particular interest in the investigation of planning abilities from
a comparative perspective because they represent our closest and
most distant great ape relatives, respectively, and therefore poten-
tially allow inferences regarding the evolution of planning ability
to be drawn (Mulcahy and Call, 2006). If the ability to plan was
present in the great ape last common ancestor, then we might
expectbothbonobosandorangutans toexhibit planningbehaviour.
If it evolvedmore recently in anAfricanapeancestor, thenwemight
expect only bonobos to perform well in our planning task. If on
the other hand orangutans outperform bonobos, this may suggest
that orangutans have reﬁned their adaptations (both anatomical
and cognitive) for arboreal living, beyond those that were present
in the great ape common ancestor. As the only great ape species
to remain in the terminal branch niche (Grand, 1972) and there-
fore still face the locomotor demands as posited by Povinelli and
Cant (1995), it seems feasible that orangutans have continued to
face strong selection pressure for the ability to mentally ‘try out’
different possible courses of action, and may therefore potentially
possess particularly reﬁned planning skills.
2. Methods
2.1. Subjects and housing
Four bonobos housed at Twycross Zoo, UK and eight orangutans
housed at Apenheul Primate Park and Ouwehands Dierenpark
Rhenen in the Netherlands, participated in this study.
Not all subjects participated in all of the experiments, and in
some experiments the number of trials completed varied between
subjects. This was to comply with zoo-speciﬁc regulations relating
to research. Details of which individuals participated in which
experiments are given in Table 1 as well as the separate meth-
ods sections for each experiment below. The number of trials
completed by different individuals is speciﬁed in the relevant
sections. Bonobos at Twycross and orangutans at Ouwehands were
naive with respect to cognitive testing, whereas orangutans at
Apenheul had previously been exposed to a trap-tube type task
reported in Tecwyn et al. (2012). The bonobos at Twycross Zoo
were housed as two separate subgroups in one indoor building
(124m2) and shared an outdoor enclosure (588m2), which the
two subgroups had access to at different times during the day.
They were fed a range of fruits and vegetables twice daily, and
received additional feeds of egg, bread or cheese once or twice per
week. Of the subjects that participated in this study, Keke, Banya
and Kichele were in one subgroup and Cheka was in the other
subgroup. The orangutans at Apenheul Primate Park were housed
in four interconnected indoor enclosures (total 232m2) and had
access to eight outdoor islands (total 1000m2). The orangutans
at Ouwehands Dierenpark were housed in three interconnected
indoor enclosures (total 370m2) and had access to an outdoor
enclosure (348m2). They also had access to an outdoor system
of ropes connected to wooden poles at a height of approximately
176 E.C. Tecwyn et al. / Behavioural Processes 100 (2013) 174–184
Table 1
Subjects that participated in the experiments reported in this study. C = captive born; W=wild born; Mo=mother-reared; H=hand-reared.
Species Subject Sex Age Birthplace Rearing Location Experiment
participation
Bonobo Cheka F 15 C Mo Twycross 1,2
Bonobo Keke M 17 C Mo Twycross 1,2
Bonobo Banya F 21 C Mo Twycross 1
Bonobo Kichele F 22 C Mo Twycross 1,2
Orangutan Amos M 11 C Mo Apenheul 1,2
Orangutan Sandy F 29 C Mo Apenheul 1,2
Orangutan Radja F ∼49 W Mo Apenheul 1
Orangutan Jingga M 4 C Mo Ouwehands 2
Orangutan Yuno M 5 C Mo Ouwehands 2
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iOrangutan Jewel F ∼27
Orangutan Tjintah F 28
Orangutan Anak F 36
0m, which extended out of the enclosure. Orangutans in both
acilities were fed a range of fruits and vegetables two to three
imes per day, as well as ape biscuits/pellets. They received
dditional feeds of egg or bread two or three times per week to
upplement their diet. Both orangutan groups were given access
o different parts of their enclosure through opening and closing
liding doors. The apes at all three institutions were managed with
n attempt to simulate ﬁssion–fusion societies, so composition of
he groups in the different sub-enclosures changed on a regular
asis. Enclosures at all zooswere equippedwith climbing elements
ncluding tree trunks, ﬁbreglass poles, ropes, netting, shelves, plat-
orms and enrichment materials. The study complied with the
ritish, European and World Associations of Zoos and Aquariums
BIAZA, EAZA and WAZA) ethical guidelines and was approved by
he ethical committee of the University of Birmingham as well as
he management committee of each of the participating zoos.
.2. Test apparatus and general experimental design
The paddle-box apparatus was attached to the outside
f the enclosures and consisted of an opaque Perspex box
60 cm×60 cm×6 cm) containing eight rotatable paddles
14.5 cm×3.5 cm×1.7 cm; 1–8 in Fig. 1a) on three levels (i–iii in
ig. 1a). There were four possible goal locations (each measuring
1 cm×4.5 cm×4.5 cm; A–D in Fig. 1a) at the base of the apparatus
hat could all either be open or blocked.
The paddle-box was designed to be mechanically accessible to
ny animal capable of operating the simple paddle mechanism,
aking it ideal for comparative testing of a number of species,
ncluding non-tool-users. The paddles were rotated by subjects
sing wooden handles (7 cm×2.5 cm×1.7 cm) that extended out
f the front of the box and were oriented parallel to the paddles
nside the box (see Fig. 1b). The handles could be operated in a
umber of ways; for example by pushing down from above or up
rom underneath at either end of a handle, or by using a twisting
ction. They were designed to be large enough so they did not
equire ﬁne motor control and thus reduce the chance of subjects
ccidentally turning them the wrong way. Once a paddle was
ig. 1. (a) Schematic depiction of the paddle box apparatus from the test subject’s viewpoi
f the apparatus showing the rewardonpaddle 4 (level ii) and theopengoal location inposi
llustrating the three positions in which the paddles could be held by magnets (ﬂat; diagoMo Ouwehands 1,2
Mo Ouwehands 2
H Ouwehands 1,2
rotated, directional choices were not easily correctable because
the reward rolled quickly off the paddle. The experimenter (E.C.T.)
could quickly and safely conﬁgure the paddle-box between trials
by rotating paddles using long rods that extended out of the back
of the box. Each paddle could be set up in one of three orientations
(ﬂat; diagonal left; diagonal right, see Fig. 1b for examples of these
orientations). Paddles were held in position by weak magnets
(Fig. 1c) so that they were easily rotatable by the subjects, but a
moving reward did not displace them from their orientation.
2.3. General procedure
The experimental procedure varied between institutions in
order to comply with the different zoos’ regulations. All subjects
were tested in off-show rooms (10–22m2) where they were held
regularly for feeding and during cleaning of the main enclosures.
The bonobos at Twycross were not isolated for testing (in compli-
ance with the institution’s ethical guidelines), and consequently
session length and the number of trials completed varied between
individuals. Usually however, a single bonobo monopolised the
apparatus during testing (though the individual varied between
testing sessions), and minimal competition for the apparatus was
observed. Orangutans were tested in isolation apart from Sandy
who was accompanied by two dependent juveniles. Subjects were
not food deprived before the trials, water was available ad libitum
and they could choose to stop participating at any time. The food
reward in each trial was a small piece of fruit (orange, apple, pear)
or bread and subjects remained motivated to obtain the rewards
throughout the study. Due to constraints imposed by the testing
area dimensions, the paddle-box was presented to orangutans at
ground-level, whereas for bonobos it was attached to the enclosure
at a height of approximately 1.5m (from the base of the paddle-box
to the ground).2.4. Familiarisation phase
There was a minimal familiarisation phase to conﬁrm the abil-
ity of subjects to retrieve a reward from an open goal location. Each
nt showing the paddles (1–8), levels (i–iii) and goal locations (A–D); (b) photograph
tionC,with theother three goals blocked; and (c) diagramof thepaddlemechanism,
nal left; diagonal right).
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ubject was presented with the apparatus with goals B and C open
nd A and D blocked, and the reward starting on paddle 7 (see
ig. 1a). Subjects could retrieve the reward by rotating paddle 7 in
ither direction and extracting the reward from one of the open
oals. Once subjects had succeeded in retrieving the reward ﬁve
imes, they were able to progress to the testing phase. None of the
ubjects experienced the reward becoming trapped during famil-
arisation. All subjects except for one achieved the familiarisation
riterion within a few minutes of ﬁrst encountering the apparatus.
ne orangutan (Jewel) did not rotate the paddle with the reward
n within a few minutes, so the experimenter demonstrated the
otation action to her. She subsequently succeeded in reaching the
riterion for progressing to the testing phase.
.5. Testing phase
Two experiments were carried out, each described in greater
etail below. In both experiments, the reward could start on any
addle excluding paddles 1 and 3 (see Fig. 1a). The reason for this
as that if paddles 1 or 3 were rotated towards the outer edge of
he paddle-box, the reward could simply drop down to the bottom
f the apparatus, missing out the paddles on the middle level. The
inimum number of steps required to retrieve the reward in any
iven trial ranged from one to three and was pseudorandomised
ithin each block, with the constraint that no more than two trials
ith the same number ofminimummoves occurred consecutively.
he paddle that the reward started on (the start paddle) and the
evel on which it was located (i–iii in Fig. 1a) were also pseudo-
andomised such that they were not the same in more than two
onsecutive trials. In all trials only one goal location was open and
he other threewere blocked. The open goalwaswhite and visually
istinct from the blocked goals that were black (see Fig. 1b). If the
ewardwas successfully navigated to theopengoal location it could
e retrieved by the test subject from the front of the apparatus. If
he reward became trapped at one of the blocked goal locations it
ould not be accessed by the subject and was removed from the
ack of the apparatus by the experimenter. For some trials it was
ossible to retrieve the reward in the minimum number of steps
n multiple ways (a maximum of three), that is, there was more
han one viable route from the start paddle to the open goal loca-
ion. Impossible conﬁgurations, in which the reward could not be
oved from the start paddle to the goal via any sequence of paddle
otations (e.g. reward starting on paddle 4 and open goal in location
, see Fig. 1a) were never presented.
.6. Data scoring and analysis
All trials were videotaped. For each trial, whether the reward
as retrieved from the open goal location (correct) or became
rapped (incorrect) was scored. In some trials, for example if a pad-
le was rotated very rapidly, the reward did not follow the path
f the pre-positioned non-food paddles and ended up in an unex-
ected goal location, i.e. subjects were not rewarded when they
hould have been, or vice versa. If the reward ended up in a blocked
oal location when the paddles were conﬁgured so that it should
ave ended up in the open goal it was scored as an ‘unexpected
rapping’. Conversely, if it ended up in the open goal location in
hisway it was scored as an ‘unexpected retrieval’. In caseswhere a
eward was ‘unexpectedly trapped’ despite the subject performing
valid sequence of paddle rotations, this was scored as correct. If a
eward was ‘unexpectedly retrieved’ in this manner it was scored
s incorrect. Information regarding each individual paddle rotation
as also recorded. Speciﬁcally:
paddle identity (1–8 in Fig. 1a)cesses 100 (2013) 174–184 177
• whether it was the start paddle (paddle on which the reward
started, e.g. paddle 4 in Fig. 1b) or a non-food paddle (all other
paddles)
• direction of rotation:
◦ left or right
◦ towards or away from open goal location (this information was
not recorded for trials in which the start paddle was located
directly above the open goal location, as was the case for start
paddle 4 and goal B, and start paddle 5 and goal C, see Fig. 1a).
• Non-food paddles that were rotated were further classiﬁed
according to:
◦ whether they were relevant (rotation enabled the reward to be
retrieved, e.g. paddle 7 in Fig. 1b) or irrelevant (did not need to
be rotated for the reward to be retrieved).
◦ the level on which they were located, relative to the level of the
start paddle (same level; above; below).
◦ timingof rotation (pre-reward insertion;whilst the rewardwas
on the start paddle; after the reward had become trapped).
A second observer (J.C.) independently scored 20% of the trials.
Inter-observer reliability was calculated using Cohen’s kappa (k),
and was excellent for all of the variables scored (experiment 1:
k ranged from 0.90 (direction of start paddle rotation relative to
goal location) to 0.98 (reward retrieval); experiment 2: k=0.89 for
reward retrieval and 0.98 for direction of start paddle rotation (left
or right)). Data were analysed using PASW Statistics 18 (IBM SPSS
Inc. 2009) and R 2.11.1 (LME4 package, R Development Core Team
2010).
3. Experiment 1: advance planning task
This task was presented ﬁrst as it was considered to be the most
difﬁcult in terms of planning demands. Presenting an easier task
ﬁrst could potentially train subjects to succeed in a more difﬁcult
task, which we wanted to avoid.
3.1. Methods
All four bonobos and ﬁve orangutans (Amos, Jewel, Sandy,
Anak and Radja) participated in experiment 1. Subjects were pre-
sented with up to 12 blocks of 12 trials. The total number of
trials completed by each subject depended on two factors: a sub-
ject’s availability for testing, and their performance in the ﬁrst
eight blocks. If a subject successfully solved any 2- or 3-step trials
then they were presented with up to four additional blocks. This
was because subjects that succeeded in this initial testing period
through planning their actions might have been expected to show
repeated success with additional testing, and we wanted to max-
imise the chance for subjects to display the ability to succeed at the
task, should it exist. Table 2 gives details of the number of trials
completed by each subject.
3.2. Paddle-box conﬁgurations
Within a block, each trial was a unique conﬁguration of the
paddle-box apparatus requiring a minimum of one, two or three
paddle rotations to retrieve the reward. In 1-step trials the reward
could start on any of the three levels (i–iii in Fig. 1a); in 2-step
trials the reward either started on the middle or top level; and in
3-step trials the reward could only start on the top level. In 2- and
3-step trials subjects had to pre-position one or two non-food pad-
dles before rotating the start paddle (see Fig. 2a for an example
of a 2-step trial). Pseudorandomisation occurred as described in
the General Procedure section. The open goal location was ﬁxed
within a block but changed between blocks. In each trial, only the
start paddle was positioned in the ﬂat orientation. All of the other
178 E.C. Tecwyn et al. / Behavioural Processes 100 (2013) 174–184
Table 2
Results of experiment 1 (advance planning) and experiment 2 (sequential planning). Number of trials correct and the number completed, and ﬁrst trial performance for each
trial-type (1-step, 2-step, 3-step). C = correct ﬁrst trial; I = incorrect ﬁrst trial; (—) did not participate.
Species Subject No. trials correct/no. trials completed; 1st trial performance
Experiment 1: advance planning Experiment 2: sequential planning
1-Step 2-Step 3-Step 1-Step 2-Step 3-Step
Bonobo Cheka 15/28; C 0/35; I 0/28; I 15/18; C 16/18; C 14/19; C
Bonobo Keke 9/21; C 0/23; I 0/12; I 19/20; C 14/20; C 17/20; C
Bonobo Banya 10/13; C 0/20; I 0/10; I – – –
Bonobo Kichele 13/27; C 0/33; I 0/33; I 8/14; C 7/12; C 6/12; I
Orangutan Amos 24/38; C 2/43; I 0/29; I 13/16; C 15/16; C 13/16; C
Orangutan Sandy 25/40; C 3/46; I 0/34; I 16/16; C 12/16; C 12/16; C
Orangutan Radja 7/18; C 2/21; I 0/11; I – – –
Orangutan Jingga – – – 12/16; I 7/16; C 7/16; I
Orangutan Yuno – – – 16/16; C 16/16; C 15/16; C
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In some trials the start paddle was located directly above
the open goal location; hence it could not be turned towards or
away from the goal., Within this subset of trials, each of the four
orangutans that preferentially rotated the start paddle towards theOrangutan Jewel 14/28; I 0/29; I
Orangutan Tjintah – –
Orangutan Anak 22/38; C 0/43; I
addles were positioned in one of the two possible diagonal orien-
ations (Fig. 2a; see also Fig. 1b). This meant that if the start paddle
as rotated ﬁrst, the rewardwould slide down to the bottom of the
pparatus and end up at one of the blocked goal locations (Fig. 2a;
ee also Fig. 1b).
.3. Results
The number of trials completed ranged from 43 to 120 (Table 2).
n 8.0% of all trials the reward was unexpectedly retrieved and
.0% of trials resulted in an unexpected trapping. Most unexpected
etrievals occurred when the start paddle was located directly
bove a goal location and the subject rotated it very rapidly, caus-
ng the reward to fall between the two paddles beneath and into
he open goal location, rather than sliding down either one of them
nd becoming trapped. The number of 1-, 2- and 3-step trials in
hich the reward was correctly retrieved by each subject is shown
n Table 2, together with the total number of trials completed by
ach subject and their ﬁrst trial performance for each trial-type.
In the majority of trials (84.9% for orangutans and 98.3% for
onobos) only the start paddlewas rotated. Based on a subject only
otating the start paddle in a trial, the probability of success in a 1-
tep trial was 0.5, because one of the two possible directions in
hich the paddle could be rotated resulted in the reward ending
p in the open goal, whereas the other direction led to it becom-
ng trapped).OnlyAmos (orangutan)performed signiﬁcantly better
han expected by chance (based on a 0.5 probability of success)
cross the 1-step trials he completed (Table 2; binomial test: 24/38
rials correct, P=0.03). Even within the subset of 1-step trials in
hich the reward started on the bottom level, again only Amos’
erformance was above chance-level (binomial test: 16/20 trials
orrect, P=0.01).
ig. 2. Schematic examples of how to solve (a) a 2-step advance planning trial
experiment 1) and (b) a 2-step sequential planning trial (experiment 2) in the
inimum number of moves.0/23; I 15/16; C 11/16; C 11/16; C
– 14/16; I 10/16; C 12/16; I
0/29; I 15/16; C 8/16; C 10/16; C
Most of the subjects did not solve any of the 2- or 3-step trials in
which oneor twonon-foodpaddles had to bepre-positionedbefore
rotating the start paddle (Table 2). Three orangutans (Amos, Sandy
andRadja)did retrieve the reward in some2-step trials (seeTable2)
and they did this by pre-positioning relevant non-food paddles in
advance of rotating the start paddle (see supplementary Video 1 for
an example).
3.4. Start paddle rotations
Two orangutans and one bonobo exhibited a signiﬁcant ten-
dency to rotate the start paddle to the right (binomial test: Anak:
82/110, P<0.001; Jewel: 50/80, P=0.034; Cheka: 62/91, P=0.001)
and one bonobo tended to rotate the start paddle to the left (bino-
mial test: Kichele: 66/96, P<0.001). The remaining subjects did not
exhibit a directional preference.
Fig. 3 shows that four out of ﬁve orangutans but no bonobos
rotated the start paddle towards theopengoal location signiﬁcantly
more often than expected by chance.Fig. 3. Percentage of start paddles rotated towards (as opposed to away from) the
goal location by each subject in experiment 1. Numbers at the base of bars indicate
the total number of trials that each subject participated in that were included in this
analysis. (*) Indicates P<0.05 and (***) indicates P<0.001 in a binomial test.
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rig. 4. Total number of relevant and irrelevant non-food paddles rotated by each s
he trial in which rotation of a relevant or irrelevant non-food paddle ﬁrst occurred
pen goal location in the above analysis (Fig. 3) rotated the start
addle in a random direction (binomial test: P>0.05 for all).
.5. Non-food paddle rotations
All of theorangutansubjects and twooutof fourbonobos rotated
t least one non-food paddle during the experiment. The total fre-
uency of non-food paddle rotations for all trials ranged from zero
Cheka andKeke) to 43 (Anak). Fig. 4 shows that orangutans rotated
ore non-food paddles (both relevant and irrelevant) than bono-
os. Orangutans did not however rotate signiﬁcantlymore relevant
han irrelevant non-food paddles (Fig. 4; Mann-Whitney U Test:
1 = 48, N2 =47, P=1.000).
For subjects that rotated relevant non-food paddles, the ﬁrst
rial in which this occurred ranged from trial 1 (Anak) to trial 87
Kichele; see numbers above bars in Fig. 4). Of the six subjects that
otated both relevant and irrelevant non-food paddles, four rotated
relevant paddle in an earlier trial than they rotated an irrelevant
addle (Fig. 4).
All subjects that rotated non-food paddles rotated more that
ere located below the starting level of the reward as opposed to
n the same level or above. Overall, 75.3% of all non-food paddles
otated were below the level of the start paddle.
.6. Discussion
Subjects generally failed at this task, even in 1-step trials
Table 2). In 93.1% of trials only the start paddle was rotated, so
ubjects rarely pre-positioned any non-food paddles, which was
ecessary for success in the 2- and 3-step trials. Three orangutans
ucceeded in some 2-step trials by pre-positioning relevant non-
ood paddles (Table 2). Although this may give an impression of an
understanding’ of the task in these particular trials, overall there
as no signiﬁcant difference between the number of relevant and
rrelevant paddles rotated (Fig. 4), suggesting that subjects may
imply have been rotating paddles at random. The position of
he non-food paddles they did rotate (most frequently on levels
elow the start paddle) may however indicate that subjects were
ware that paddles higher up in the apparatus were less likely to
nﬂuence the path of the reward because the reward only ever
oved down towards the bottom of the paddle-box. Bonobos
ery rarely rotated any non-food paddles (Fig. 4). However, the
bserved difference in propensity to rotate non-food paddles may
eﬂect a difference in the two species’ exploratory tendenciest across all trials in experiment 1. Numbers above the bars indicate the number of
and temperament (Herrmann et al., 2011), or variation in testing
conditions, rather than any difference in cognitive ability.
Although subjects generally only rotated the start paddle, four
out of ﬁveorangutans (but nobonobos) didpreferentially rotate the
start paddle towards the open goal location (Fig. 3). Furthermore, in
trialswhere the start paddlewasdirectly above thegoal, these same
subjects turned thepaddle in a randomdirection.While turning the
start paddle towards the open goal did not enable subjects to suc-
ceed in the task, it suggests that they may at least have encoded
information about the relevance of the open goal for retrieving
the reward, and turned the start paddle so that the reward moved
towards it. Subjects that did not preferentially rotate the start pad-
dle towards the open goal may not have encoded the relevance
of the open goal location, despite the fact that it was visually and
haptically distinct from the blocked goal locations (see Fig. 1b). It is
also possible that these subjectsmayhave exhibited this behaviour,
had they been given a small amount of pre-training so that they
learned about how the reward moved depending on which way
the start paddle was rotated. However, as there was no evidence
for improvement in performance across sessions this is perhaps
unlikely.
The failure in 2- and 3-step trials of subjects that apparently
encoded the relevance of the goal location could either have
stemmed from a lack of understanding of how non-food paddles
affected the path of the reward, or their inability to inhibit the pre-
potent response to rotate the paddle with the food on (i.e. the start
paddle).
Reaching directly for a desirable object is known to be a pre-
potent response, the prevention of which requires the ability to
reject some alternative (inappropriate) actions and favour others
(Diamond, 1990). The salience of the food reward on the start
paddle may have meant that subjects were unable to divert their
attention to other relevant aspects of the apparatus (i.e. the posi-
tions of the non-foodpaddles) (Vlamings et al., 2010). Food salience
is known to affect the performance of several primate species in
reversed contingency tasks, where subjects are presented with a
choicebetweena small anda largequantityof food, but they receive
the opposite of what they select (Boysen and Berntson, 1995). In
the delay of gratiﬁcation test on the other hand, apes have accu-
mulated food items for several minutes before taking the rewards
(e.g. Beran, 2002).
It is unclear what caused the subjects that seemingly encoded
the relevance of the goal location to fail at this task. Possibilities
included: (1) an inability toplananappropriate sequenceof actions,
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2) an inhibitory control problem, and (3) a lack of understanding of
ow diagonally positioned non-food paddles inﬂuence the path of
he reward. In the second experiment we eliminated the two latter
ossibilities to determine whether this improved subjects’ ability
o plan in the task.
. Experiment 2: sequential planning task
.1. Methods
Three bonobos (Cheka, Keke and Kichele) and seven orangutans
Jingga, Yuno, Amos, Jewel, Tjintah, Sandy and Anak) participated
n experiment 2. Jingga, Yuno and Tjintah had not participated in
xperiment 1 and so had no previous experience with the appa-
atus apart from the familiarisation phase. All seven orangutan
ubjects were presented with four blocks of 12 trials (one block
ith the open goal in each of the four possible locations); the num-
er of trials completed by the bonobos varied between subjects
Cheka: 55, Keke: 60, Kichele: 37).
.2. Paddle-box conﬁgurations
In this experiment, all of thepaddleswere set up in aﬂat orienta-
ion at the start of each trial. The number of steps required to solve
ach trial was dictated by the level on which the reward started.
s in experiment 1, all trials could be solved in one, two or three
teps. The key difference here was that all trials could be solved
y rotating the start paddle ﬁrst, and then by rotating paddles on
hich the food was subsequently located, so subjects never had to
re-position non-food paddles. An example of how to retrieve the
eward in a 2-step sequential trial is shown in Fig. 2b. In this trial
here was only one correct route from the start paddle to the open
oal location. However, in several of the 2- and 3-step trials the
eward could be retrieved by taking a number of different routes.
s in experiment 1 the start paddle and number of steps required
o retrieve the reward (i.e. the start level) were pseudorandomised
ithin each block. The open goal location was ﬁxed within a block
ut changed between blocks.
.3. Results
Overall performance ranged from 54.1% (Kichele) to 97.9%
Yuno) of trials correct (see Table 2 for performance in different
rial-types and supplementary Video 2 for an example of a suc-
essful 3-step trial). However, because the probability of success
aried betweendifferent trial-types, itwas not possible to conclude
hether or not individual subjects’ overall performanceswere bet-
er than expected by chance. Therefore, ﬁve different trial-types
ere identiﬁed, the probability of success for each was calcu-
ated, and each subject’s performance within each trial-type was
ssessed.
.4. Performance in different trial-types
In all 1-step trials therewasa50%chanceof success, basedon the
tart paddle being rotated immediately (as was the case in exper-
ment 1). The 2-step trials could be classiﬁed as those for which
here was only one solution (i.e. only one possible route from start
addle to goal, as in Fig. 2b), and those for which there were two
olutions (two viable routes from start paddle to goal). Similarly,
-step trials could be split into those with only one solution, and
hose with three viable solutions.It was possible to calculate the probability of retrieving the
eward by chance in each of these 2- and 3-step trial-types based
n the premise that subjects always rotated the paddle on which
he food was located at any given point in a random direction. Forcesses 100 (2013) 174–184
example, to solve the 2-step trial in Fig. 2b (where there is only one
valid route to the goal) the subject had to rotate the start paddle
to the left (step 1 in Fig. 2b), then rotate the bottom centre pad-
dle to the left (step 2 in Fig. 2b). The probability of this sequence
occurring was 0.5 * 0.5 =0.25. Therefore, for this trial-type there
was a 25% chance of the reward being retrieved by chance. Hav-
ing calculated probabilities of success for the different trial-types
(see supplementary Fig. S.1 and the accompanying material for
additional details), it was possible to examine subjects’ individual
performances using binomial tests, the results of which are shown
in Fig. 5 (see supplementary Table S.1 for individual binomial test
results).
Binomial tests were not used to assess performance in the 2
steps, 2 solutions trials (Fig. 5b), because the maximum number of
trials of this type completed by a subject was four.
One bonobo (Kichele) and one orangutan (Jingga) did not per-
formbetter thanexpectedbychance inanyof the trial-types (Fig. 5).
Three orangutans (Yuno, Amos and Anak) and two bonobos (Cheka
and Keke) performed better than expected by chance in all of the
trial-types for which binomial tests were run (Fig. 5). The remain-
ing three orangutans all performed above chance-level in all but
one trial type; Tjintah did not reach criterion in the 2 steps, 1 solu-
tion trial-type (Fig. 5d) and Jewel and Sandy failed in the 3 steps, 3
solutions trial-type (Fig. 5c).
Jingga, whowas unsuccessful across all trial-types, was the only
subject to improve his performance across testing blocks. In block
1 he retrieved the reward in 42% of trials, compared with a 75%
success rate in his last block (Friedman test: 21 = 4.0, P=0.046).
None of the subjects exhibited signiﬁcant directional prefer-
ences when rotating start paddle (binomial tests: P>0.05 for all).
This includes the three subjects that did exhibit directional prefer-
ences in experiment 1.
Two out of three orangutans (Jingga and Yuno) subsequently
succeeded in an additional version of this task, in which the goal
locationwas switched between trialswithin each block, as opposed
to only between blocks (supplementary Fig. S.2). Unfortunately it
was not possible to test any additional subjects in this version of the
task, due to safety concerns associatedwith the proximity between
the experimenter and subject thatwas necessary to switch the goal
location between trials.
4.5. Factors associated with success
To explore the factors related to success in experiment 2, we ﬁt-
ted a generalised linear mixed model (GLMM) with binomial error
distribution, using correct or incorrect sequence of paddle rotations
as a binary response. We began by entering all probable explana-
tory terms and possible two-way interactions between them. The
start-level of the reward, the location of the open goal, species and
sexwere included as ﬁxed factors, as well as start-level×goal loca-
tion as an interaction term. Subjectwas included as a random factor
on the intercept, and trial number as a random effect on the slope
(Crawley, 2007). Terms were sequentially dropped from the model
until the minimal model contained only terms whose elimination
would signiﬁcantly reduce the explanatory power of the model
(Thornton and Samson, 2012).
The full model (AIC =491.3) showed that the start-level of the
reward inﬂuenced the likelihood of subjects performing a correct
sequence of paddle rotations (and hence retrieving the reward).
Dropping the interaction term (start-level×goal location) signiﬁ-
cantly reduced theexplanatorypowerof themodel (likelihood ratio
test comparing the twomodels:26 = 21.86, P=0.0013) so this term
was retained. Neither sex nor species signiﬁcantly affected suc-
cess, so these terms were dropped from the model. Trial number
explained little variance in the model; indicating that the subjects
did not improve over the course of the experiment (Crawley, 2007).
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Fig. 5. Percentage of trials correct for each subject (Ch=Cheka, Ke=Keke, Ki =Kichele, Ji = Jingga, Yu=Yuno, Am=Amos, Tj = Tjintah, Je = Jewel, Sa = Sandy, An=Anak) within
the ﬁve different trial-types in experiment 2. Numbers at the base of bars indicate the total number of trials of this type in which the subject participated. Dashed lines
indicate the percent chance of retrieving the reward if the start paddle and subsequent paddles on which the food was located were rotated in a random direction: (a) 50%;
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rb) 50%; (c) 37.5%; (d) 25%; (e) 12.5%. (*) Indicates P<0.05 in a binomial test. Bino
ubject was 4, but the graph is shown for completeness.
he minimal model (AIC =488.7) did not signiﬁcantly differ from
he full model in terms of explanatory power (24 = 5.38, P=0.25).
ost-hoc Tukey tests were used to investigate pairwise compar-
sons between the different start-levels. There was a signiﬁcant
ifference in performancewhen the reward started on level 1 com-
ared with level 3 (Z=3.217, P=0.004), but no difference between
evels 1 and 2 or 2 and 3.
.6. Discussion
Most subjects performed well in this task. Only one orangutan
nd one bonobo failed to perform better than expected by chance
cross any trial-type (Fig. 5), but theorangutan (Jingga) did improve
igniﬁcantly across testing blocks. These results suggest that in this
xperiment, the majority of subjects encoded the relevance of the
pen goal location and were able to plan an appropriate sequence
f paddle rotations to retrieve the reward, or learned todo soduring
he experiment. It is particularly noteworthy that Yuno and Tjintah
ere successful given that they did not participate in experiment
, implying that previous experience with the apparatus was not
equired for success in this task.ests were not run for (b) because the maximum number of trials completed by a
The GLMM results and Fig. 5 show thatwhen the reward started
on the top level subjectswere signiﬁcantly less likely to retrieve the
reward compared with when it started on the bottom level. This is
what would be expected if the number of steps that must be con-
sidered increases cognitive demand, as was found to be the case
in sequential tool-use experiments with New Caledonian crows
(Corvusmonuloides:Wimpennyet al., 2009) andgreat apes (Martin-
Ordas et al., 2012). Interestingly, more subjects performed better
than expected by chance in the 3 steps, 1 solution trials (12.5%
chance of success) than in the than 3 steps, 3 solutions trials (37.5%
chance of success). In the 3 steps, 1 solution trials, the goal had to be
located prior to rotating the start paddle, because if the direction of
this ﬁrst rotation was incorrect then the reward was subsequently
impossible to retrieve. However, because the goal was always in
position A or D (see Fig. 1a) for these trials, subjects could suc-
ceed by using the rule ‘rotate paddle with food on towards the
open goal’. Also, in the 3 steps, 3 solutions trials the paddles had
to be rotated in different directions, whereas in the 3 steps, 1 solu-
tion trials every paddle had to be rotated in the same direction,
which may have been less challenging from a motor control per-
spective.
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. General discussion
Using a new paradigm (the paddle-box)wewere able tomanip-
late the demands involved in a physical planning task in which
ubjectshad to retrievea foodreward fromanopengoal location.By
esigning an apparatus that is simple to operate, does not require
omplex tool-use and has an adjustable level of difﬁculty, we feel
hatwehave gone someway to developing a test of planning ability
ppropriate for a range of species.
.1. What evidence for planning?
Overall, subjects failed in experiment 1 but succeeded in exper-
ment 2, though there was substantial inter-individual variation
n performance in both experiments (see Table 2 and Fig. 5).
lthough both experiments in this study required subjects to select
etween multiple possible sequences of actions, experiment 1
osed more complex information processing demands than exper-
ment 2. As well as needing to encode information regarding how
he diagonally positioned non-food paddles would inﬂuence the
ath between the reward’s starting position and the goal, in 2- and
-step trials subjects had to inhibit the prepotent response to turn
he start paddle with the reward on immediately. In experiment
on the other hand, trials could be solved by always turning the
addle with the reward on ﬁrst, because all of the paddles were in
ﬂat orientation. This permitted the task to be solved in a more
tep-by-step manner, because the position of the reward relative
o the goal location could be reassessed at each level.
The fact that subjects of both species could retrieve the reward
hen theywere able to plan in a step-by-stepmanner (experiment
) suggests that they did encode relevant task features such as the
elevance of the open goal. The success of two orangutans (Yuno
nd Tjintah) in experiment 2 without having participated in exper-
ment1alsodemonstrated thatprior experiencewith theapparatus
as not a prerequisite for success in this task; rather experiment 2
as (as predicted) an easier task. Successful performance of most
ubjects in experiment 2 is in keeping with the ‘one-element plan-
ing’ demonstrated by chimpanzees during 2D maze navigation,
here subjects made decisions at each choice point on the basis of
ne property (e.g. Euclidean direction to the goal; Fragaszy et al.,
003). However, in the 2- and 3-step trials that only had one possi-
le solution in experiment 2 of our study, the initial paddle rotation
ad to be in the correct direction, otherwise the rewardwould have
nded up in a location from which its retrieval was impossible.
herefore, in these trials, subjects had to plan their ﬁrstmove based
nwhere the goalwas located. Furthermore, in trials in experiment
where there were multiple possible correct sequences of action,
rangutans solved them in a ﬂexible manner, utilising different
outes from a given start paddle to a goal, sometimes turning the
tart paddle away from the Euclideandirection to the goal (Tecwyn,
ersonal observation). This suggests that they did not simply rely
n a procedural rule based on turning paddles towards the goal.
rangutans and bonobos have previously exhibited planning skills
n captive experiments.Martin-Ordas et al. (2012) recently demon-
trated that all four species of great ape are able to use up to ﬁve
ools in sequence to retrieve a reward. Both species have also been
ound to be capable of saving tools for future use (Mulcahy and
all, 2006). The results of experiment 2 in this study provide evi-
ence of the ability of captive orangutans and bonobos to plan an
ppropriate sequence of actions outside of a complex tool-using
ontext..2. Interspeciﬁc differences in paddle-box performance?
Unfortunately it was not possible to draw direct comparisons
etween the performances of the two species due to unavoidablecesses 100 (2013) 174–184
methodological differences, particularly those concerningwhether
the subjectswere tested individually or in a group.Generally speak-
ing, individuals that are able to concentrate and are not distracted
will perform better in cognitive tasks (Herrmann and Call, 2012),
and attention is known to be important in planning tasks (Parrila
et al., 1996).While orangutanswere tested individually (apart from
those with dependent infants or juveniles), bonobos were tested
in their social groups. This may have disrupted their attention,
and prevented them from perceiving and encoding relevant task
features. Conspeciﬁcs could have attempted to steal the rewards,
whichmayhave introduced a competitive element and encouraged
impulsive behaviour, depending on which other individuals were
present (Stevens and Stephens, 2002). There was also the poten-
tial for subjects in the same subgroup (Keke, Banya and Kichele)
to learn to solve the tasks through observation, but we found no
evidence for this.
However, some differences between orangutans and bonobos
were apparent in experiment 1, which when taken together with
the ﬁndings of other experimental work warrant further investi-
gation. Although neither species succeeded in experiment 1, four
orangutans but no bonobos preferentially rotated the start paddle
towards the opengoal location (Fig. 3). It is possible that individuals
that preferentially rotated the start paddle towards the goal were
able to inhibit rotating the start paddle until they had attended to
thegoal location. There is someevidence to suggest that orangutans
outperform other great ape species in other physical problem-
solving tasks requiring inhibitory control (Albiach-Serrano et al.,
2012; Vlamings et al., 2010), whereas other studies have reported
an absence of interspeciﬁc differences (Vlamings et al., 2006; Uher
and Call, 2008).
Inhibition of inappropriate actions may be important for efﬁ-
cient locomotion through the forest canopy (an idea that is touched
upon by Vlamings et al., 2010). A large bodied ape moving through
the discontinuous, compliant forest canopy is faced with a vast
amount of information to process, and must make correct deci-
sions regarding which supports to use and which to avoid, as a
wrong choice could result in a fall, causing serious injury, or even
death (Thorpe et al., 2009). In this situation, the ability to attend
to what lies ahead and mentally ‘try out’ different actions prior to
choosing which route to take would be highly beneﬁcial (Povinelli
and Cant, 1995; Barth et al., 2004). Others have related apparent
differences in inhibitory control skills in primates to differences
in their social systems. Speciﬁcally, good inhibitory skills have
been linked to species with high levels of ﬁssion–fusion dynam-
ics (Amici et al., 2008), because of the need to assess a situation
before acting, and respond in away that is appropriate based on the
current composition of the party (Aureli et al., 2008). While both
orangutans and bonobos are considered to experience high levels
of ﬁssion–fusion dynamics (Amici et al., 2008), orangutans have
a more extended, less cohesive social system (Aureli et al., 2008).
This means that intraspeciﬁc competition for food, which may pro-
mote impulsive food-grabbing behaviour, is relatively reduced in
orangutans (Shumaker et al., 2001).
Three orangutans but no bonobos solved some of the 2-step tri-
als in experiment 1 by pre-positioning relevant non-food paddles
(Table 2). Orangutans rotatedmorenon-foodpaddles thanbonobos
overall, but they were not necessarily relevant (Fig. 4). It is possible
that thisﬁndingmaybe related to speciesdifferences inexploratory
behaviour and temperament (bonobos have been shown to be shier
of novel things thanorangutans;Herrmannet al., 2011), rather than
a difference in cognitive ability.5.3. Why did apes fail in the advance planning task?
Negative results in tests of cognitive ability are notoriously dif-
ﬁcult to interpret, because there could be several different causes
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f failure (Seed et al., 2012). Although experiment 2 removed
nhibitory demands, it also eliminated the need to encode how
iagonally positioned non-food paddles inﬂuenced the path of the
eward, so it is difﬁcult to determine the relative contributions of
hese factors to failure in experiment 1. One way to try and illumi-
ate causes of failure in tasks designed to investigate a particular
ognitive ability is to minimise peripheral demands that are simul-
aneously taxed during testing (Seed et al., 2012). For example,
n the case of inhibitory control, it has been demonstrated that
eplacing foodwith tokens in the reversed contingency taskenables
ubjects to inhibit the strong behavioural predisposition to select
he larger quantity (Boysen andBerntson, 1995; Boysen et al., 1996;
ralik et al., 2002; Albiach-Serrano et al., 2007; Addessi and Rossi,
011).
Another way of potentially reducing the inhibitory demands of
he task presented in experiment 1 would be to enforce a delay
etween subjects seeing the paddle-box with the reward present
ndallowing themto respond. Childrenareknowntobemore likely
o avoidmaking an inappropriate prepotent responsewhen a delay
s short as two seconds is enforced by the experimenter in several
ifferent tests of inhibitory control, and it has been proposed that
his is because the delay permits time for passive fading of the pre-
otent response, rather than allowing time for active computation
Simpson et al., 2012). It would be interesting to see if young chil-
ren, whose inhibitory control skills are known to show marked
mprovementbetween theagesof3and5years (CarlsonandMoses,
001) also struggledwith the advanceplanning taskbefore this age,
ndwhether takingmeasures to reduce inhibitory demands (e.g. by
eplacing rewardswith tokens or enforcing a delay)might improve
heir performance.
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